

Outer Space Files

Van Tassel 22nd

Daily Diary for Dec 16, 17, 54

Col Robert L. Schultz (014 495)

CIA

U.S. Dept of Defense

U.S. Pres. Comm on Scientists and Engineers

NSC

Loebkin Signal Corp (White House)

Mount Weather

Kissinger

government, was that rare anomaly in the thirties, a growth industry. Butcher, in on the boom from the beginning, commanded a large and ever-increasing salary. As handsome as a movie star, charming and breezy, popular around town, Butcher was both fun to be with and a good man to know.⁵

Major General George Van Horn Moseley, who had been Pershing's chief of supply, was Eisenhower's immediate superior in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Moseley was a man of extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views. Much concerned with the specter of Communism, in the fall of 1930 he recommended that the War Department round up all radicals and ship them off to Russia.⁶ After his retirement in the mid-thirties, he strongly criticized the New Deal and associated himself with Gerald L. K. Smith, among others.⁷ Eisenhower, who was accustomed to hearing Army officers curse radicals and other undesirables, reacted as he usually did to such frothing—he would listen, nod, and change the subject. He did not necessarily disagree with the analysis, such as it was, but he was too much a middle-of-the-road American to accept such solutions as Moseley's recommended deportation. Mostly, he regarded such talk as none of his business and paid little attention. Politics had no interest for him, and he shrank instinctively from extremism.

He thought Moseley, in his professional capacity, an outstanding officer, "dynamic . . . always delving into new ideas . . . an inspiration." Eisenhower was aware that Moseley created the "impression" that he was "a reactionary or a militarist," but said that was a distortion; Moseley, to Eisenhower, "was a patriotic American unafraid to disagree with a consensus."⁸ In 1940, Eisenhower told a friend that Moseley, "in spite of his retired activities, was a shrewd judge of officers." For his part, Moseley called Eisenhower "my brainy assistant," and in his efficiency report wrote that "no limit should be placed on this officer." Moseley predicted that "he will go far in the Army."⁹

The two men had a difficult task because the Chief of Staff, General Charles Summerall, was "contemptuous" of their work. Summerall issued orders forbidding any officer on the General Staff to enter the offices of anyone assigned to the Assistant Secretary of War, which meant specifically Moseley and Eisenhower.¹⁰ The problems cut across service lines too. There was an interservice agency, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, that was supposed to engage in joint planning for industrial mobilization, but it hardly ever met and did no significant work, primarily because the Navy was not interested. This was because the

Navy expected to fight the next war with the fleet in being, while the Army anticipated a vast expansion. In a lecture to the students at the Army Industrial College in Washington, Eisenhower put it politely when he noted, "Neither the Army Navy Munitions Board nor its subsidiary committees have been particularly active during the last nine years, nor have they always been able to settle controversial questions placed before them."¹¹ Thus Eisenhower and Moseley were isolated from their sister service as well as from the industrialists, the government, and their own General Staff. Under the circumstances, they could do little more than study the experience of the World War, when America had mobilized under the direction of a series of special, civilian-run superagencies, capped by Bernard Baruch's War Industries Board.¹²

In the fall of 1930, Douglas MacArthur replaced Summerall as Chief of Staff. With that change at the top, the office of the Assistant Secretary of War came to life. MacArthur was a close friend of Moseley's, and Eisenhower was delighted by the new Chief of Staff's "enthusiasm" and "encouragement and advice."¹³ That same year, Congress created the War Policies Commission to study "policies to be pursued in the event of war" and how "to equalize the burdens and to minimize the profits of war." The resolution creating the commission directed it "to study and consider amending the Constitution" in order to make war unprofitable and require everyone to bear its burdens equally. Supporters talked in terms of conscripting private property as well as men in any mobilization. The general hope was that if the government took the profit out of war through seizure of property, it would eliminate well-financed campaigns agitating for American entry into war. The commission was a high-powered body—Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley was the chairman, while five other Cabinet officers, four senators, and four congressmen made up the membership. The War Department's plans for mobilization were obviously central to the committee's concerns, and MacArthur was told that he would have the job of presenting the hitherto "secret" (in fact, nonexistent) industrial mobilization plan.¹⁴

MacArthur told Moseley and Eisenhower to get to work, and by the end of 1930 they had produced a plan. It covered a host of topics, such as price controls, priorities, foreign trade, commandeering industrial plants, and, most important, the creation of special government superagencies to maintain centralized direction over industry, manpower, selective service, and public relations. All these agencies, the plan made clear, would be under civilian control.¹⁵

In the spring of 1931, the commission held open hearings. Indus-

trialists came to the War Department to discuss their testimony in advance. MacArthur sent them to talk to Eisenhower. It was Eisenhower's introduction to the leaders of what he himself would later call the "military-industrial complex"—which, obviously, hardly existed in 1931, not even in embryonic form. Nevertheless it was an important experience for Eisenhower. Up to 1930, he knew little about American industry, its problems, capacities, or organization. Now he was in daily working contact with some of its great captains. Not surprisingly, Eisenhower found that these men "directly opposed the idea of actual seizure of all property" in time of war.¹⁶ Eisenhower attended the hearings, and although he did not testify himself—MacArthur was the spokesman for the Army—he did confer before and after the sessions with the commission members and those giving testimony.¹⁷

But in truth, all this activity went on in a vacuum. Despite the prominence of the members of the commission and of the people who testified before it, few people paid much attention. The Hoover Administration had other, more pressing concerns; the Roosevelt Administration ignored the War Department plan. The agencies created in 1941 to supervise mobilization bore only a superficial resemblance to Eisenhower's blueprints.¹⁸ For Eisenhower personally, the work was a valuable introduction to some of the responsibilities and concerns he would deal with as President, although it gave him a one-sided view of labor-management-government relations.

In immediate terms, the best thing about the planning job for Eisenhower was his contact with MacArthur. The Chief of Staff was impressed by Eisenhower's work, his smooth cooperation with the industrialists, his mastery of detail, his writing style, his ability to reflect the attitudes and opinions of his superiors. He began to utilize Eisenhower's talents, asking the major to draft some of his speeches, letters, and reports. The Chief of Staff was generous in his praise; in a handwritten note in 1932 he scribbled on a draft of a report: "Dear Eisenhower; A magnificent effort on your part. Much better than I could have done myself. I am grateful. MacArthur."¹⁹ He also placed more official and formal praise in Eisenhower's 201 file; a typical letter thanked Eisenhower for his willing acceptance of a special assignment (drafting the Chief of Staff's Annual Report) and his fine performance. "I write you this special commendation," MacArthur concluded, "so that you may fully realize that your outstanding talents and your ability to perform these highly important missions are fully appreciated." In his efficiency report on Eisenhower, MacArthur stated flatly that "this officer has no superior of his time in the Army . . . Distinguished by force,

judgment and willingness to accept responsibility." MacArthur added that Eisenhower was "well qualified for civilian contacts."²⁰

Douglas MacArthur was one of the two most important men in Eisenhower's life. The other was George C. Marshall. It was Eisenhower's luck to know and work for these outstanding generals, each one a powerful personality and a historic figure. They were vastly different in their leadership techniques. MacArthur was bombastic, flamboyant in dress, egotistical, outrageous in his flattery, intensely partisan, keen to enter the political fray. Marshall was soft-spoken, reserved in dress, modest, slow to praise, staunchly nonpartisan, reluctant to enter the political fray. Both served Franklin Roosevelt as Chief of Staff, but their conceptions of the relationship of the head of the Army to the President were sharply different. MacArthur's was one of antagonism, Marshall's of complete support. They also differed on a fundamental strategic question, the relative importance of Europe and Asia to America. One result was to divide the U.S. Army and its General Staff into two groups, the "MacArthur clique" and the "Marshall clique," or the "Asia-firsters" and the "Europe-firsters."

Eisenhower spent eleven of his thirty-seven years in the Army working directly under these two men, seven with MacArthur, four with Marshall. Each general liked and respected Eisenhower. They had good reason to do so. Eisenhower did his work brilliantly. It was always done on time. He loyally supported his chief's decisions. He adjusted himself to his chief's time schedules and to other whims. He was able to think from the point of view of his chief, a quality that both MacArthur and Marshall often singled out for praise. He had an instinctive sense of when to make a decision himself, when to pass it up to the boss. MacArthur said of Eisenhower in a fitness report in the early 1930s, "This is the best officer in the Army. When the next war comes, he should go right to the top."²¹ In 1942 Marshall showed that he agreed with that assessment by implementing the recommendation.

Because of his frequent disagreements with MacArthur, a conviction developed that Eisenhower hated working for MacArthur and tried desperately to obtain a transfer. Reportedly, too, MacArthur was bitter toward Eisenhower and deliberately held him back, which supposedly explains why Eisenhower was still a lieutenant colonel in 1940, on his fiftieth birthday. But an account of the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship that concentrates on bitterness, hatred, and jealousy, with the emphasis on their fights, is much too simple. Their relationship was rich and complex, with many subtle nuances, and was highly profitable

for the Republican presidential nomination, and once the Democratic party had nominated John F. Kennedy the duel was on. And a fierce one it was, ending in the closest contest (in popular votes) the nation had yet seen.

Whatever his private feelings at Nixon's defeat, Eisenhower quickly mobilized his staff for the smoothest possible transition to a new Democratic administration. As the weight of the presidency was about to lift from his shoulders, Ike was determined that there should be a gracious transfer of power. He even found some parts of the process amusing. Emerging on the north portico of the White House to greet President-elect Kennedy, he saw for the first time the sprawling wooden reviewing stand being erected on Pennsylvania Avenue for the inaugural parade. Suddenly the stern presidential frown broke into a big grin as he snapped: "I feel like the fellow in jail who is watching his scaffold being built."

January brought a flurry of farewells to old friends. It also brought lonely moments as big army trucks lumbered off into the darkness carrying cartons of papers and gifts from kings, sultans and the poor—on to the Eisenhower Museum at Abilene. And daily Ike turned to one special assignment close to his heart—his farewell address. Friends thought he should appear before Congress to deliver it. But Ike said no. It was the content that counted, he said, not the immediate contact. He was striving to reach tomorrow's conscience, not today's headlines.

On January 17, 1961, the oval office was invaded by the television cameras for the last time while Dwight D. Eisenhower was president. Maroon-colored felt was taped to his desk to cut the glare, and electric cables crisscrossed the floor like a bed of snakes. Ike began his short fifteen-minute address slowly. It was fifty years, he said, since he had entered the public service when appointed to West Point by a United States Senator. He was grateful to the nation and to the Congress which had cooperated with him throughout this half-century of America's adventure in free government. Then, after wishing his successor Godspeed and every good fortune, he jumped into his farewell theme.

Unlike her earlier years, he said, America had now been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of "vast proportions." Over three and one half million men were in the service of the national military establishment alone. The coming together of this immense military establishment and a large arms industry meant that its combined influence—"economic, political, and spiritual"—would be felt in every city, state house, and every office of the federal government. The implications of such power were explosive. Because the possibility for the "disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence of the military-industrial complex within the councils of government."

The outgoing president said he wished he could report that a lasting peace was in sight, but happily he could say that war had been avoided. Then he closed with

TOP SECRET

November 25, 1959

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED
TO THE PRESIDENT
BY THE PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF CONSULTANTS
ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**



Since its creation in 1956 The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities has submitted four reports to the President. The recommendations contained therein are set forth below, together with additional recommendations made orally by the Board when it met with the President (Recs. #19, 21) on December 16, 1958.

The First Report - 12/20/56

- Rec. #1: That the DCI be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility in directing the integration of the national intelligence effort.
(DCI)
- Rec. #2: That a realistic appraisal be made of the Intelligence Community's organization and responsibilities and of its ability to guarantee proper coordination with the military in time of war.
DCI
Sec Det
- Rec. #3: That action be expedited to bring the planning for intelligence activities in time of war to the highest feasible state of readiness and that a realistic war-gaming of them begin as soon as practicable.
DCI
Chairman CS
- Rec. #4: That action be taken to effect strong, centralized direction (both through the NSC and the DCI) of the Intelligence Community and its resources, in order to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its costs.
DCI
- Rec. #5: That present practices with regard to clandestine operations be regularized to insure that clandestine projects receive proper joint staffing and formalized approval, and that State and Defense be kept abreast of developments thereunder.
5412 Group
- Rec. #6: That action be initiated at once to meet the existing need for coordination of the "unattributed" programs of USIA and CIA.
Director, USIA
DCI

| |
|---------------------------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS |
| E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b) |
| Agency Case <u>NSA MDR 95/11</u> |
| NLE Case <u>95-32*6</u> |
| By <u>JKW</u> NLE Date <u>4/10/97</u> |

TOP SECRET

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating original.

Photocopied at the Eisenhower Library

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -



Rec. #19:

JCI
Special Group

That (1) the Special Group, established pursuant to paragraph 7, NSC 5412/2, be instructed to assume responsibility for making periodic review and evaluations of significant clandestine cold war programs conducted pursuant to NSC 5412/2; (2) that a study be made of the relationship of the Special Group to the CIA; and (3) that NSC 5412/2 be re-examined in the light of these recommendations.

Rec. #20:

Sec Def

That a single office within the Department of Defense, and this preferably to be within the organization of the JCS, be designated as the point of contact for all official dealings between the DOD and the CIA for the planning of both Hot War and Cold War Operations having military implications.

Rec. #21:

DCI
Sec Def

That a system of tests be initiated with respect to critical intelligence communications.

Rec. #22:

Sec State
Sec Def
DCI
Director, NSA

That in important COMINT-ELINT areas strong leadership be exercised by the Director, NSA, with full support by the Department of Defense and by the Military Departments (in terms of adequate facilities, proper equipment and qualified personnel).

The Fourth Report - 8/12/59

Rec. #23:

Sec Def
DCI

That (1) the existing CRITIC-COMM system be reviewed and reorganized to optimize its capabilities and to relate it ultimately to the sound objective of an integrated global communications network; (2) that same be accomplished under the guidance of the Sec/Def; (3) that there be searching tests of the system on a frequent basis; and (4) that there be an immediate accounting of existing practices and equipment of the present CRITIC-COMM network with a view to optimization of procedures for recognition, handling and routing of priority messages, and for the purpose of refurbishing of any needed equipment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

X

TUESDAY

1

JULY

182nd
Day183 Days
to come

9:30. VISIT O&T Division

10:10 - Mr. William Bullitt.

10:30. Mr. Kolitz
request of Congresswomen
Bolton

11:00. General Hughes

11:45 - Mr. Gilbert Bailey
accompanied by General Parks
(New York Times Magazine)

12:15. General Hull

2:00. Dr. Conant - President
Harvard University

WEDNESDAY

2

JULY

183rd
Day182 Days
to come

9:00. General Wedemeyer

9:15 - Captain John Killick

9:30. Dr. Frederick Cans

10:00 - Hearings - House Armed
Services Committee - War Bill

12:00. General Crittenberger



THURSDAY

3

JULY

184th
Day181 Days
to come

- 9:00. General Handy
 9:15. Generals Handy & Devens
 9:30. General O'Hare

11:00^{EST.} - Depart Washington
 National Airport for
 Vicksburg, Miss.
 accompanied by Colonel
 Michaelis, M/Sgt. Day
 with guests Senator Eastland
 & Congressman Williams

1400 - EST. Arrive Jackson Army
 Air Base, met by Major
 General Crawford & Major
 Haining, drive to Vicksburg.

Evening. Buffet dinner ashore
 & return to spend night aboard
 the General Newton.

FRIDAY

4

JULY

185th
Day

Independence Day

180 Days
to come

6830^{EST} - 0920. Recruiting and Press
 Conference, General Crawford's
 office.

0930 - 1030. Parade



1100 - Broadcast by Chief of Staff
 from steps of Courthouse

1130. Ceremonies conclude. C/S
 & Party return to Newton

SATURDAY

5

JULY

186th
Day

179 Days
to come

0830 CST. Depart by motor for
Jackson Army Air Base

0930 - Take off aboard C-54
9146

1630 EDT. - Arrive Washington
National Airport
Party met by Major
Cannon.

SUNDAY

6

JULY

187th
Day

5th Sunday after Trinity

178 Days
to come



MONDAY

7

JULY

188th
Day177 Days
to come

8:30 - Conference on UMT 6111

10:00 - Appear before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
Trusteeship of Pacific Islands

12:00 - War Council in Secretary
of War's office

12:45 - General Collins + Colonel
William H. Neblett for
lunch

2:00 - Visit P + A Division

3:15 - Food Service Conference
2 or 3 minute talk
Army War College.

4:00 - Mr. Paul V. McNutt.

TUESDAY

8

JULY

189th
Day176 Days
to come

9:15 - Mr. Bert A. Hedges
National President of War
Dads

10:00 - Generals Paul + Street
recruiting - S/W's conf.
room.

11:30 - Mr. Stuart Dymington

12:00 - Mr. General Arthur Lerch
Military Governor of Korea

12:30 - Mr. George Allen,
Mr. Drim, President
Home Life Insurance Co.
for lunch + present General
DOE with Scrapbook - 17th.
Also delegation stayed for
lunch.

1904
Day

WEDNESDAY

6

JULY

175 Days
to come

9:15 - Mr. Paul A. Lawrence,
 (Adjutant General, U.F.W.) Mr.
 L. David Kenney & Mr. H.N.
 Humaday - (Capt. Keenan)
 unable to attend
 9:30 - Visit P 10 Division
 10:45 - General's Handy Herstad
 Gaves a Presentation
 12:00 - 5CS bringing in General
 Handy's office
 12:30 - Mrs. Eisenhauer, Mr.
 and Mrs. Bond for
 lunch in office

1914
Day

THURSDAY

10

JULY

174 Days
to come



9:30 - General Bahlgvist
 10:00 - General Ball - Divisional
 Unit Citation
 11:00 - General Paul and
 staff members re members
 12:45 - luncheon with
 Secretary Forrester - room
 2046, Navy Dept.

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



8 MAR 1960



MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT : Fifth Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 11 December 1959. (Recommendation Regarding "Strategic Warning Mechanism")

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ZAC review
By SLK NLE Date 8/24/2000

1. Your memorandum of 26 January requested my views and comments on a specific recommendation contained in the subject report.

2. The first two parts of that recommendation directed the Director of Central Intelligence to have the Intelligence Community complete the aforementioned survey at the earliest possible date, and further directed that, based on the survey, it prepare expeditiously specific indicator lists to supersede the general indicator list which is now in use.

3. Work is now well along on the Warning Systems Survey, and a draft report is expected to be presented to the USIB on about 29 March. This report will include a proposed revision of the earlier General Indicator List. This draft revision is in effect a collection of specific functional indicator lists. It has been used largely as a basis for conducting an evaluation of collection capabilities. This evaluation of collection capabilities will show which indicators are realistic.

4. The concluding section of the Board's action recommended that the President "issue whatever directives are necessary to insure that the facilities of the Intelligence Community's Watch Committee and its National Indications Center are organized, supported and operated in such manner as to (a) maximize the Intelligence Community's efforts to effect timely receipt, processing and evaluation of available information pertaining to strategic early warning, and (b) to insure the timely transmission


TOP SECRET

*Log 9 and 3/14/60
700-200-1000
172579*

TOP SECRET

to higher authority of significant information bearing upon the early warning problem." I do not believe that any further special directives are necessary at this time. The CRITIC reporting system for speeding the delivery of critical information to Washington is showing improvement; the status of this system was reviewed in a memorandum to you, dated 5 December 1959, signed by the Secretary of Defense and myself, with the subject, "Critical Intelligence Communications."

5. In commenting on this recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities I would stress that the Intelligence Community is constantly striving to improve our early warning capabilities. We are especially aware of the new and challenging problems in the early warning field created by new weapons developments of recent years.


ALLEN W. DULLES
Director



TOP SECRET

X

January 2, 1959

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. HARLOW

In a recent meeting with Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray, the President laid great stress on the arrangements he employs to keep control of intelligence and clandestine operations in his own hands, to maintain effective oversight of such activities by groups acting on his behalf and reporting directly to him (the Hall Board and the "Deputy Secretaries" group), and keeping in close touch with current operations through the most effective possible executive organization -- all the while making great efforts to maintain the security of these activities.

He added that one reason for the foregoing is to obviate any tendency for Congressional groups and their staffs to get into these activities. He cited the experience of the British and others who have been highly successful in these matters, and the importance to their operations of keeping knowledge of specific activities confined to a small handful of people.

He felt that the tendency toward "supervisory" activity on the part of the Congress over the substantive operations and intelligence of CIA would be most harmful to his responsibilities as Commander in Chief of the nation's security and foreign policy. This is particularly true of proposals for additional committees to involve themselves in these activities; he showed some interest, however, in the idea of a single joint committee to work in this field, and to be the sole point of contact of the DCI with the Congress.

A. J. Goodpastor
Brigadier General, USA
Staff Secretary

Cy: General Persons

OUTER SPACE - SOME PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

BY

WILLIAM A. HYMAN, Chairman

of

Subcommittee on Air Space

of the

NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

Delivered at the Symposium on Outer Space on
November 12, 1958, at the Hotel Roosevelt,
45th Street and Madison Avenue, New York City.

On the 4th day of October 1957 our national complacency was shattered by the news that Sputnik I had been successfully launched by the Russians. On that eventful day the previously unknown realm of outer space was pierced. Sputnik I, weighing 184 lbs., went into orbit encircling the earth at the fantastic speed of 18,000 miles per hour. There followed rapidly Sputnik II, weighing 1120 lbs. on November 3, 1957 and then again on May 15, 1958, Sputnik III of the unbelievable weight of 2925 lbs. was successfully launched into orbit.

America followed on January 31, 1958 with Explorer I weighing 31 lbs. and on March 17, 1958 with Vanguard weighing $3\frac{1}{4}$ lbs., on March 26, 1958 with Explorer III weighing 31 lbs., on July 26, 1958 with Explorer IV weighing 38 lbs., and finally in October, 1958, Pioneer weighing 82.7 lbs. went about 79,000 miles on the way to the moon but returned to the earth over the Pacific Ocean.

These launchings, however, appear to be but a prelude to the main performance that is expected in 1959 and 1960. According to

The further suggestion was made that each nation be declared to be the sole owner and exercise sole control over the troposphere and stratosphere above its own territory.

The situation is critical. Let me quote from a statement of United States Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman of the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics of the United States Senate. He stated:

"Space has implications for virtually all of human activity. Space, as a dimension, enlarges the field of all our various earthly enterprises from commerce and trade to education and communication. The material of the Space Age may well reshape the structure of basic industry. The technology of space will have incredible impact upon our consumer goods. Our leisure and luxuries, as well as our essentials, will be affected. The size of our economy and its financial values will be influenced and altered. So also will be where we live, what jobs we hold, what products we sell, what foods we eat, what land we farm, what medicines are prescribed for us. At present, our vision in this realm could scarcely be more myopic."

The press on November 11th, 1958, announced the appointment of Senator Lyndon Johnson to the U.N. for the purpose of having him support the United States resolution calling for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes introduced a few weeks ago and which resolution called for a study of the control of outer space vehicles "for the benefit of all mankind." Senator Johnson emphasizes that

this move was bi-partisan, transcending all party considerations, and that it was a contribution toward making outer space an avenue towards peace instead of an arena for war.

Our government realized that the concurrent and overlapping work of numerous agencies in and out of the government to solve the problems of space explorations involving defense and security, would lead to chaos, duplication of effort and waste of money. In an effort to avoid such undesirable results, there was established the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. Effective as of April 1, 1958 Mr. Roy W. Johnson was appointed its first Director to develop specialized advanced research projects including military outer space and defense from ballistic missiles. Mr. Johnson stated to the House Space Committee that death rays may make the hydrogen bomb obsolete.

The press has been full of stories of the attempts at lunar exploration. In fact, General Jimmy Doolittle has given up a job with Shell Oil paying him \$100,000 a year in order to devote his time and talent to the study of outer space. More and more men of ability are plunging into this new area of exploration. The question, however, which presents itself forthwith is whether or not any old rules of law or international codes and agreements and treaties will furnish the basis for determining the rights of the respective nations who are venturing into outer space.

What are the rights of sovereignty and discovery?

Roman law stated that in order to obtain the right of possession of an immovable, the law of governing land, "a bodily attitude and a mental attitude" was required. It was necessary that there be an